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THE COMMON NEED FOR 
CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS: 
AGAINST A FEMINIST ALTERNATIVE
The difficulties of justifying a recipe for scientific inquiry that calls for sen­
sory experience and logic as sole ingredients can hardly be overestimated. 
Resolving the riddles of induction, steadily mounting against empiricism since 
Hume, has come to seem like an exercise in making bricks without straw. To be 
forgiven the debt of solving these riddles, whether by feminists or others, would 
come as a great relief. But such relief, I shall argue, can come only at the very 
high price of removing any capacity to evaluate inductive inference patterns. And 
if traditional philosophy cannot tolerate this loss, feminism should tolerate it even 
less.
Traditional epistemology adopts a framework in which justification is a 
logical or semantic relation in which a belief stands to its ground. Critics of tra­
ditional epistemological foundations, with feminists prominent among them, 
would relieve us of the obligations to address the logical problems by advising 
the adoption of naturalized foundations. The central component of naturalism in 
epistemology is the teaching that the causal tributaries (psychological as well 
as sociological) to a subject’s belief also bear on that belief’s warrantability. We 
are invited to make the epistemological evaluation of a belief a function also of 
its causal tributaries, and thereby to fill out the lean basis for justification (namely 
sensory experience) countenanced by classical empiricism; causal tributaries will 
ostensibly help us bake the missing bricks.
Contemporary devotees of naturalized epistemology fall into two distinct 
groups. Approaching from the precept that epistemological ‘ought’s imply epis­
temological ‘can’s is one group of critics who, with an eye to the modeling of 
cognition, maintain that epistemology must be sensitive to the cognitive capaci­
ties of the belief-forming agents to whom epistemological imperatives are issued. 
Epistemology, they say, must take into account the limitations placed on agents 
by natural processes responsible for belief acquisition, maintenance and change.1 
And taking Quine’s advice (though on the basis of reasons independent of those 
Quine offers) these naturalizers call on the philosophical community to make 
epistemology at least in part a chapter of psychology.
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Quine called to our notice that the human subject, with the most meager 
sensory input (primarily the patterns of light irradiation impinging on her retina 
together with those of pressure waves penetrating her outer ears), comes at a very 
tender age to be possessed of a highly detailed description of a three-dimension­
al external world and its history. How does this subject construct a model of the 
world, adequate to the demands of survival, from the “raw” experience that 
cannot even be described in propositional form? “If there is one way there are 
many, but any is a great achievement.” 2 Quine simply assumed that the individ­
ual human subject produces an empirically adequate description of the world, and 
consequently that the inference patterns implemented by the human subject must 
be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of survival. (And what other purposes 
matter?) Quine’s hope was that psychology would set itself the task of discover­
ing precisely those inference patterns that human subjects implement (whether 
consciously or not), thereby saving epistemologists a good deal of work since 
“any way is a great achievement.”
The second group of naturalism’s devotees includes feminists and other aca­
demic activists; I will refer to them as “alternativists” from here on. These have 
swelled the ranks of converts to the naturalization movement, perhaps because 
they perceive sociologization of epistemology (a subspecies of naturalization) as 
vital to promoting the interests of politically and socioeconomically disadvan­
taged groups. They foresee an epistemological theory that assigns higher marks 
to beliefs formed by members of disadvantaged groups in virtue of the recogni­
tion that members of such groups are generally better placed for producing true 
beliefs. Advancing a holist critique of science3 (but again from motivations that 
Quine himself would not embrace), alternativists recommend the replacement of 
logical foundations with sociological theory and promote the view that the psy­
chological (and hence also the sociological) origins of a belief are relevant to the 
question of its evaluation; on this program the subject’s gender, race and socioe­
conomic identity become relevant to her or his belief’s epistemological virtue. 
Alternativists hold that the disproportionate emphasis placed by traditional efforts 
on logical concerns is due to political naivete in the history of a subject that hails 
from an age of philosophical innocence in which epistemologists on both sides of 
the rationalist-empiricist divide believed in the human capacity for cognitive ob­
jectivity: on the rationalist side in the detachment of reason, on the empiricist side 
in the possibility of deriving synthetic generalizations of a scientific cast directly 
from sensory experience alone. But the time for naivete is past, we are urged. The 
age of epistemological modesty, inaugurated by Duhem and Quine, the era of 
holism and naturalization, is upon us. It is time for science without dogma—time 
for empiricism without illusion.
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In this age of modesty we are to have absorbed the truth that our beliefs 
about the world “face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only 
as a corporate body.”4 It follows immediately that sense experience cannot be a 
guide to the isolation of error in a collection of beliefs. We are told that any belief 
in a corpus can be rationally held true in the face of recalcitrant experience, if the 
subject is willing to overhaul appropriately compensatory elements in the “web” 
that is the corpus of belief; conversely, no article of belief is positively immune 
to revision. On the web model (that is contrasted with the edifice model) of the 
corpus, the choice of what goes by the board in the face of disappointing encoun­
ters with the world is not—and cannot be—dictated by a recipe that is in turn an 
article of scientific methodology. The choice is legitimately made—and rou­
tinely—on the basis of antecedently held value or prejudice. Since for holists any 
belief can rationally be held true come what may, the epistemological guidelines 
of holism must of necessity be thin. They can, in effect, be no more stringent than 
a rule of noncontradiction, so long as they constrain the subject to make modest 
concessions to experience now and again. Anything more stringent than consis­
tency can be regarded only as a “rule of thumb.”
Traditionally, the aim of epistemology has been to promote the acquisition 
of true beliefs. This is no less an aim of mainstream naturalism in epistemology.5 
Now a variety of alternativist epistemologists share this common goal inasmuch 
as they have joined in support of the thesis that there are a variety of patterns for 
arriving at beliefs, and some are to be preferred to others in virtue of the fact that 
they are more productive of truth. No doubt these alternativists still consider 
themselves bound by a commitment to register criticism of execrable but socially 
approved beliefs concerning the inferiority of disadvantaged groups. Such 
criticism, if it is to be dispensed on a basis neutral with respect to the socioeco­
nomic and gender origins of the subjects of belief, has need of a standard by 
which inference patterns are rated independently of the subjects to which the 
beliefs in question are attached. Such a standard, I will show, is unavailable on 
the basis of naturalized foundations. The reason is that naturalism is committed 
to a doctrine that the primary subject of epistemological commendation is the 
agent, and a neutral standard cannot be constructed on the basis of agent-relative 
ratings. I conclude that a naturalistic position is a tactical error for those with a 
need for an agent-neutral standard of evaluation, if they are not to suppress 
universal condemnation of the biases they abhor.
Now the traditional framework for framing epistemological questions is 
designed specifically for the brand of denunciation alternativists would like to 
have available. Thus rather than oppose traditional foundations, alternativists 
should be prepared to cast their lot with those of the traditional school. It is only 
by advancing the brand of rational censure for which traditional foundations are
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designed, condemning every subscriber of bias without regard for her or his 
gender or socioeconomic origin, that feminism and other alternativisms will at­
tain their social and political aims.
1. Questions
I will reserve the terms ‘inference pattern’ and ‘pattern’ to denote logical 
entities: logical schemas or recipes, composed of a set of premises or grounds and 
a conclusion. Examples are: (1) Bayesian patterns of adjustments to prior proba­
bility assignments on the basis of new evidence via conditionalization rules; (2) 
statistical assignments of confidence to hypotheses based on calculations 
involving relative likelihood; (3) “I wish p, therefore p .” Only the first two 
examples are serious contenders for attention in epistemology of science. The 
term ‘process’ I will reserve for physiological or psychological means of pattern 
implementation; these are causal affairs. Examples of processes include mechan­
ical and physiological analogs of theorem-proving, mechanical implementations 
of Bayesian or statistical procedures, as well as streams of wishful thinking, 
modes of brainwashing, habits of adopting beliefs expressed by others, and so on. 
We can think of an actual inference as having two components, in direct analogy 
with a distinction between software and hardware. The “software” aspect of an 
actual inference is its logical form: every inference is an instance of at least one 
inference pattern. The “hardware,” by contrast, is its psychophysiological imple­
mentation: the ground of the inference serves as input and its conclusion serves 
as output of some one causal process.
With this distinction in mind we can identify (at least) two potential 
questions for inquiry. The first—call it the logical question—is the question 
whether a belief B is justified relative to a subset of beliefs Q that I will call the 
ground, which is presumed to be justifiably held by subject S. This is a question 
of the heritability of warrant among a set of beliefs in exactly the same way that 
validity is a question of the heritability of truth among a set of propositions. And 
like issues of deductive validity, it turns on the relationship between the truth 
values of B and Q in the set of possible worlds, most especially the actual world.6
The second question—call it the generation question—concerns how ad­
justments to the beliefs of S are systematically influenced by properties of the 
social system in which S is embedded. (Errors are of especial interest, but we are 
not restricted to explaining pathology alone. An account of belief propagation is 
a species of empirical study: the study of the coming into being and passing away 
of the natural entities that are beliefs.) How, for example, does S come to assent 
that women do not have rational minds, or to be systematically neglectful of the 
cultural and intellectual achievements of African civilizations, or to regard the
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social properties of a minority group as intrinsic natural traits? These are to be 
distinguished from the associated logical questions (how can one be justified in 
believing there are other minds, what is the status of a memory in relation to the 
epistemic status of the experience that gives rise to it, and how can we distinguish 
the accidental from the necessary) in that the logical questions concern the 
practice of empirical confirmation, while the generation questions presuppose it.
The generation question is uncontroversially a scientific one, since it re­
quires systematic disclosure of contingent matters of fact: wherefore some 
beliefs, and not others, come to be and pass away within a particular population 
of believers S. As a scientific question it is not a purely logical question. Now 
naturalism is the thesis that the answer to the first question depends on an answer 
to the second; the traditional position is that they are independent. In this section 
I will argue for independence, a claim which requires argument since the logical 
issue might be reasonably expected to depend on the nature of the relationship of 
the content of S's beliefs Q and B to the truth about the actual world, the deter­
mination of which is rightly regarded a scientific (i.e., empirical) matter. Since 
scientific inquiry does not obviously fail to bear on the first question, it remains 
open whether our treatment of the logical question should be responsive to 
findings concerning the generation question. I will argue that it should not. The 
logical question, I will show, is never concerned with the pedigree of a belief, but 
rather always with the merit of the best pattern of inference of which the belief 
and its ground is a substitution instance.
A schema for an answer to the generation question will most likely take the 
following form:
Schema G: Members of S, in their efforts to comprehend the rapid continuous 
flow of events (especially social events), are as much causally in­
, fluenced by < . . . > as by conscious processes or attention to formal 
patterns of judgment formation. Consequently < . . . > exerts pres­
sure on investigations of a scientific nature. As a result it influences 
the beliefs shared among large segments of the population. And this 
is the predominant reason why women are perceived to be intrinsi­
cally more primitive than whites, etc.
In this schema ‘< . . . > ’ is a placeholder for names of psychophysiological pro­
cesses controlling the evolution of intrasubjective belief; I am imagining it will 
make reference to something like forces or automatic processes of judgment 
formation that are comparatively difficult for subjects to override by conscious 
effort.7 A proposal conforming to Schema G  presents a mechanism for the 
adoption, perpetuation and dissemination of beliefs in a population S, thereby
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giving account of intersubjective mechanisms responsible for shared true beliefs 
as well as those that result in systematic error since (if true) the correct instance 
of the schema explains the propagation of true and false beliefs alike.8
The logical question, by contrast, concerns the formulation of acceptable 
rules of (scientific) induction. As standardly illustrated, this is the problem of 
fitting a continuous curve to a finite number of data points. The curve-fitting prob­
lem is well-known. It is a standard tool for illustrating Hume’s gap between the 
observed and unobserved.9 Now one reason that empirical findings are con­
sidered to bear on the logical question is that, in advance of knowledge regarding 
the form of data or the nature of data-gathering mechanisms, we cannot determine 
the width of the gap between that which follows deductively from observation 
and that which does not. (It is logically possible that we are able to observe 
directly the deepest laws by which nature operates.) For example, the gap 
between the hypothesis “All ravens are black” and observation that ravens A, B 
and C are black, cannot be determined before we recognize that the enumerated 
ravens do not exhaust the class about which the hypothesis projects; further, that 
enumeration fails to exhaust the relevant class in a particular way, namely by 
falling considerably short of the denumerable infinity of ravens that might—for 
all we know—be the actual referent of the hypothesis. Which further empirical 
matters are relevant to the logical question? This is a comprehensive debate.10 I 
will concern myself here only with whether an answer to the logical question 
should be affected by correct instances of Schema G. I will conclude that it 
should not. Every candidate answer one might care to name in connection with 
the logical question is compatible with every instance of Schema G. To put the 
substance of my claim another way, the logical question is the question whether 
the inference from S's current base beliefs B (stipulated to be justified) to S's 
inductive conclusion Q is a substitution instance of an inductively reliable— 
though not necessarily indefeasible—form of inference; from this it follows that 
no reference to S need even be made in the framing of this question. (Reference 
to S is made only inessentially for the purpose of picking out the relevant Q and 
B\ the reference can be eliminated by specific enumeration of Q and B\ on elim­
ination the question becomes: can Q serve as a reliable ground for B in the actual 
world?) To the logical matter, the matter of extraction—the psychophysiological 
processes by which S arrives at Q—is not relevant. The logical issue can be 
settled even when no answers to process questions are known.
My case for this is simple. First I stipulate that epistemic commendation 
attaches to inference patterns. Now suppose S makes a set of observations D  and 
concludes C. Since, as I’ve stipulated, commendation attaches to inference pat­
terns, to settle whether S ’s inference to C  is warranted, we must consider all 
possible schemas of inference passing from D  to C  and ask whether any of these
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patterns is reliable. S’s inference receives a portion of epistemic commendation 
in proportion to the commendation due to the most reliable pattern of inference 
of which that inference is a substitution instance. Thus the logical question 
assigns epistemic commendation in proportion to the commendation due to the 
most reliable pattern of inference of which that inference is a substitution in­
stance. Thus the logical question assigns epistemic commendation to S only in a 
derivative sense. The primary subjects of commendation are the patterns of infer­
ence from D  to C. The primary subjects of epistemic commendation arc items in 
relation to which question of process of belief generation do not even make sense. 
Inference patterns themselves are the primary subjects of the logical question. 
Thus the inductive question is exactly parallel to the deductive question. If I 
believe that p  and also that if p  then q, then I am deductively justified in believing 
q, not because my process of generating q is somehow better than other processes 
I could have used, but because modus ponens is a valid form of inference. In fact, 
I might generate q purely out of wishful thinking, and my conclusion would still 
be deductively valid. The questionability of my process for generating q does not 
diminish the validity of my inference in the least. Now since the epistemic value 
of an inductive inference does not depend on the process used to generate the 
conclusion, every hypothesis conforming to Schema G is consistent with the 
correct answer to the logical question.11 The independence of the two issues is 
proved.
Surely, you say, my argument cannot be satisfactory to my opponent. For my 
opponent may easily fault my initial stipulation that (inductive) inference patterns 
are themselves the primary subjects of epistemic commendation, an assumption 
that coincides exactly with adoption of the traditional epistemological 
framework, and one which guarantees the primacy of the logical question by 
making attributions of epistemic virtue parasitic upon attributions of virtue to 
inference patterns. It is this very premise which most requires argument. The 
critic rightly challenges the stipulation that subjects receive epistemic commen­
dation only derivatively in proportion to whether they do or do not employ 
reliable patterns.121 will devote the remainder of this section to argument that any 
alternative construal of the logical question undermines the important project of 
rational evaluation, which I take to be a primary task of epistemology. Alternative 
conceptions of the logical question, if adopted, would culminate in a rejection of 
the possibility of rational evaluation of inference patterns. Thus my initial stipu­
lation that subjects receive commendation derivatively will receive an argument.
Suppose that the primary subjcct of epistemic commendations is the agent 
or agent’s actual psychological process of arriving at a belief B. (Recall some 
examples of such processes: implementations of proof algorithms, concession to 
authority, conscious or unconscious repetition of sentences expressing a target
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belief, tossing a coin, and the list goes on indefinitely.) Now can it make sense to 
assign commendation to an inference pattern, say modus ponens or a Bayesian 
adjustment of probability assignments, of which the subject’s actual inference is 
a substitution instance, based on the commendation we assign the subject? 
Suppose S believes p , that if p  then q , and (finally) q. Diverse instances of the 
familiar processes of reasoning by which humans arrive at beliefs can each un­
derwrite this substitution instance of modus ponens. Thus S may employ any 
number of processes by which to arrive at q\ she could either ( 1 ) implement a me­
chanical proof algorithm that conforms to modus ponens, or (2) she may imagine 
q , find it pleasing and opt to believe it. If she were to implement the former 
process, she—and derivatively modus ponens—would receive one (presumably 
high) epistemic rating; if the latter, she—and subsequently modus ponens— 
would receive another (presumably lower and therefore incompatible) rating. 
Thus unless the evaluation of inference patterns is conducted without regard for 
the evaluation of the particular subjects implementing them, the rating system for 
patterns is doomed to be a collection of colossal contradictions (unless, of course, 
the ratings for subjects is itself based on purely logical rather than causal criteria, 
in which case the ratings may be consistent). As soon as we require a consistent 
rating for inference patterns, we require that this rating be screened off from the 
ratings due to subjects, with the screen being unnecessary only on condition that 
ratings for subjects follow logical criteria. The point is that if we give up on the 
project of evaluating patterns of inference in a logical framework, we will have 
no resources with which to evaluate inference patterns consistently. We cannot 
use evaluations passed on subjects or processes to recover a (consistent) set of 
evaluations for inference patterns. Thus the deficit cannot be made up from the 
pockets of naturalism.
Now one may suggest that we rate subjects on naturalistic criteria, and make 
up the deficit in pattern evaluation by a traditional logical analysis. In that case, 
the ratings for patterns will be independent of the rating for subjects. Why should 
we take this course? Recall that one major motivation for introducing naturalized 
foundations is to make up a perceived shortfall in the resources of the logical 
program, which has, to date, produced no satisfactory justification of any 
inductive inference pattern. If we leave the problem of rating patterns as we found 
it, then naturalism does nothing to lighten the original burden. We are no further 
along than when we began. But perhaps we can yet rate subjects via naturalistic 
prescriptions, whatever lacks remain in our capacity to rate patterns. This, 
arguably, is some progress. But if the rating systems are independent, what con­
fidence can we have that the rating of subjects has anything to do with truth? In 
fact we can be sure that it does not if it is genuinely independent of the rating for 
patterns. For, if ratings for subjects were somehow linked to the production of
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true belief, then we would be able to recover from it a rating for patterns (by a 
process of filtering out other factors on which subjects are rated) since this 
depends on truth conditions alone; the latter, however, is precisely what I argued 
we cannot do. I conclude, then, that as long as we affirm a need to rate inference 
patterns, we cannot do without traditional logical foundations. And if such foun­
dations become available, then supplementing them with additional resources for 
rating subjects is both redundant and confusing.
I will argue in the next section that feminists have a clear and urgent need 
for rating inference patterns. Without the capacity to rate inference patterns the 
feminist has no basis for dispensing criticism on grounds neutral to a subject’s 
gender or socioeconomic origin. And without this capacity the feminist cannot 
condemn bias universally. Thus even the feminist must regard the logical ques­
tion as a primary, even if not necessarily the sole, epistemological concern. And 
it is thus a tactical error for feminists to set themselves against traditional foun­
dations.
Are there better arguments than so far considered for the thesis that psy­
chology must bear on epistemology? The best argument for taking the point that 
the logical question depends on more than a priori (logical) considerations is due 
to Friedman.13 Friedman argues that the prospects for an a priori justification of 
scientific method (what I have been calling induction) are negligible for two fun­
damental reasons (both of which go back to Hume): (i) the epistemic advantage 
of any pattern must be linked to its tendency to produce true (or at least approx­
imately true) beliefs; and (ii) no incurably nondeductive pattern (which a 
scientific method must be) is logically guaranteed to yield true conclusions on the 
basis of the sort of observations available to humans because, relative to possible 
observations, there is no inductive pattern more reliable than every other in every 
logically possible world. A determination of the best inductive pattern, whether it 
be Bayesian or statistical or neither, for any particular possible world depends on 
the details of that world. These details can be revealed only in empirical inquiry.
Even so, Friedman’s argument does not support the conclusion that consid­
erations of process bear on the logical question.14 Friedman argues that the 
reliability of a pattern of belief formation M  depends on the manner in which the 
actual world would present itself to us if the belief (C) to which it leads were true. 
If so, then to determine whether M  is reliable, we must determine whether C  is 
true.15 To oversimplify, if in 100 trials a coin produces r heads, we are justified in 
assigning high marks to a method M  that itself confers high ratings on the hy­
pothesis that the coin is disposed to turn up heads at the rate of r, only if there is 
an argument that adduces reasons that the hypothesis will produce accurate pre­
dictions, especially for circumstances like those obtaining in our trials; this 
argument can be made only on condition that we know what the world is like, and
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especially that we know what our experimental circumstances are like. Now a 
pattern M  might rate more highly than a pattern N  by Friedman’s prescriptions. 
But no assignment of a reliability rating requires determination of actual 
processes by which human beings arrive at beliefs. And the converse is also true: 
determination of the actual processes by which human beings form beliefs 
advances in no way the determination of the reliability of a given pattern M. The 
commendation Friedman enjoins us to dispense is to be attached to patterns. Thus 
Friedman’s argument cannot be pressed in service of an alternativist conception 
of epistemological foundations.16
Other writers have advanced the relevance of generation considerations on 
the logical questions. Goldman argues that traditional epistemology has formu­
lated advice for the direction of the mind without taking under consideration the 
cognizers’ capabilities.17 As a result it has recommended rules and prescribed 
patterns which human subjects cannot in actual practice implement in view of 
certain psychological limitations; traditional epistemology has ignored the 
precept that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. An epistemology that takes its regulative role 
seriously must be one that tailors its advice not to the “ideal” subject, whoever he 
might be, but to the actual subject of the prescription. The cognitive agent is 
subject to psychological (as well as physiological) laws. Hcncc psychology is 
relevant to epistemology.
In support of the same conclusion, Kornblith offers what he takes to be an 
argument discrediting the traditional attitude toward epistemology, an attitude he 
terms the “arguments-on-paper thesis”—essentially equivalent to my initial stip­
ulation that commendation attaches primarily to inference patterns—the view that 
a person has a justified belief in a particular proposition “just in case that propo­
sition appears on the list of propositions that person believes, and either it 
requires no argument, or a good argument can be given for it which takes as 
premises certain other propositions on the list.” 18 Kornblith offers an argument 
that the arguments-on-paper thesis is false. He directs us to consider Alfred who 
justifiably believes that p , justifiably believes that if p  then q , and believes that q 
as a result of wishful thinking. Now according to the arguments-on-paper thesis 
Alfred is indeed justified in believing that q since there is a good argument that 
can be given for q on the basis of propositions Alfred already believes (and justi­
fiably). Kornblith, however, maintains that Alfred is not justified in his belief that 
q because he fails to believe it on the grounds submitted by that argument (or 
some other valid basis). For Alfred to be justified in believing that q , maintains 
Kornblith, that belief must depend in a causal way on his respective affirmations 
of p  and if p  then q. Questions of justification of belief must be intimately tied to 
questions about the sorts of processes responsible for the presence of those 
beliefs. Hence Kornblith’s argument, if correct, would not only serve to discredit
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traditional approaches to epistemology, but would also establish a connection 
between process and justification.
To offer this argument a critic must adopt the attitude (as Kornblith does) 
that epistemic commendation attaches in the first instance to agents. (Kornblith 
offers us nothing more than his own unsupported judgment that Alfred’s belief in 
q is unjustified because it is the result of wishful thinking.) I refer this critic to 
arguments laid out at the beginning of this section. The arguments there offered 
for declining the suggestion to attach epistemic commendation directly to agents 
establish good reasons to embrace the arguments-on-paper thesis.19
Kornblith’s concerns suggest there might be an intermediate position be­
tween the arguments-on-paper thesis and the attaching of epistemic commenda­
tion in the first instance to subjects. It might be supposed that there is an 
alternative that has us assign commendation to subjects on the basis of that com­
mendation due to the inference pattern they actually employ (as distinct from 
assigning commendation on the basis of the epistemic regard due to the best 
pattern of which the subject’s inference is a substitution instance). Consider now 
the question: what grounds an attribution that subject S is employing pattern PI 
Suppose we ask the subject to report on her reasons for arriving at her conclusion. 
Would that help us to identify a basis for the attribution? No. The subject’s report 
helps us to identify her psychological process in the same way that questioning 
Kornblith’s Alfred would indicate he arrived at his belief by wishful thinking. But 
interrogating Alfred will not help us discover that his inference is an instance of 
modus ponens. The reasons is that inference patterns are inductive analogs of 
deductive argument form s or schemas. An actual argument can be an instance of 
any number of argument forms; likewise an actual inference can be an instance 
of any number of inference patterns. A report on the subject’s psychology cannot 
fix the inference pattern because the inference pattern does not inhere in the 
subject at all. Thus we cannot award subjects epistemological merit on the basis 
of the pattern they actually employed because there is no such unique entity. 
Charity in judgment of a subject is not only recommended: it is positively 
required.
But we cannot leave Kornblith’s concern here, for the conclusion wc have 
registered (namely that the only empirical results relevant to the logical question 
concern the issue of how reliable is the best inference pattern of which 5”s 
inference is a substitution instance) seems to run afoul of the approved precept: 
ought implies can. We are subject to the criticism that, if  the answer to the logical 
question applies to any subject, it nevertheless does not apply to actual human 
agents since human agents are subject to process constraints when passing from 
belief to belief. This concern deserves an answer. Without further delay, here it is. 
Suppose it is true that human subjects are not in a position to implement the
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advice of epistemologists on the topic of induction. Then so much the worse for 
humans. If the epistemologies can have nothing but condemnation for the sorts of 
methods humans can practicably employ, then humans are certainly in a bad spot. 
But epistemic advice is not a palliative; it is a corrective. Epistemology should 
tell us just how much confidence we can legitimately maintain in our beliefs as 
purported truths, not compensate for human deficits.
The objection, however, misconstrues the force of the epistemological im­
perative I envision. Answers to the logical question will not take the form: beliefs 
derived by pattern M  are justifiable whereas those derived by pattern N  are not. 
Rather the answers will come in the form: pattern M  is more reliable than N, 
which in turn is more reliable than L ; and agents will be invited to adopt any 
pattern more reliable than the worthiest one of which their current judgments are 
instances. In other words, a full account of the logical question will rank patterns 
of inference according to a standard of reliability for this actual world. It might 
even rate patterns of collecting data. Somewhere in the ranking will be the 
worthiest pattern of which my judgments are instances; somewhere will be 
ranked the worthiest associated with yours; perhaps they are the same pattern, but 
we cannot determine this until the traditional epistemologist’s task is effectively 
complete (which is to say we are a long way from making these determinations). 
And if it should turn out that the best pattern associated with your judgments is 
more reliable than that associated with mine, then I am better advised to imitate 
you than to persist in my feeble habits, and better yet to adopt a pattern that is 
more worthy than yours. Hence, as long as I am not employing the best possible 
pattern, epistemology will have some advice for me.
The response to the ought-implies-can criticism is, finally, that it is overly 
pessimistic. Epistemic life is very complex: what reasons have we to believe that 
humans cannot employ relatively reliable patterns of induction? It is said that 
because positivism is wrong (in that simple empirical claims have no conditions 
of verifiability all their own), there can be no objectivity and hence no objective 
reliability.20 Positivism is wrong also because there is no genuinely “raw” data. 
And because observation is laden with theory there is no possibility of reliability 
in the enlightenment sense. Since the observational can never be marked off from 
the theoretical, the logical question never even comes to be relevant since there 
is no “raw” data on which to apply inductive patterns. This point, finally, takes us 
past the issue of ought-implies-can, and moves us firmly onto the ground of 
dogma.
However the lack-of-objectivity point is often made hyperbolically. No one, 
and especially not the alternativists, supposes that the referent of the term ‘theory- 
ladenness’ undermines scientific pursuit entirely. Taking holism and 
theory-ladenness as points of departure from traditional epistemology, alterna-
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tivists—feminists especially— standardly reject the conventional privilege 
granted to “laboratory” science. Perhaps it is right to deny institutionalized 
science the privilege it currently enjoys over its less well-regarded counterparts. 
But an official reproof of institutionalized science cannot substitute for con­
demnation of the scientific enterprise as such, much less of traditional epistemo­
logical foundations. Institutionalized science might very well turn out to be a 
failure even by the traditional epistemologist’s standards.21 Ideal scientific 
inquiry and institutionalized science are not one and the same thing—and espe­
cially not as evaluated by traditional accounting methods. In fact one primary aim 
of traditional foundations is to align the institutions of empirical inquiry with 
ideal methods of inquiry.
Now in fact, alternativists do not uniformly believe any thesis to the effect 
that there are no patterns worthy of implementation. Some theorists explicitly 
provide for patterns more reliable than others (though they do not call these 
“patterns”). They talk about the privileged perspectives of women or African 
Americans. Some take the privilege to be grounded in biology. Others take it to 
be shaped by sociological factors. Still others locate the privilege in the specific 
experiences or “standpoints” of the privileged subjects. Each of these views takes 
it for granted that there exist “patterns” for inference (though some of these 
patterns may not be available to everyone) such that the adoption of these patterns 
guarantees truth more reliably than adoption of their competitors. For the sake of 
specificity let us focus on the claims of feminist standpoint theory. Stripped to es­
sentials, standpoint theory has it that the standpoint of women (their social status 
and concomitant experiences, including their “women’s labor” and their child­
rearing activities) affords women deeper insight into reality because it limits their 
perspectives less than the standpoint of men limits theirs. Beliefs, as the theory 
goes, are not unmediated, unsocialized responses to present experience; beliefs, 
rather, are at once the products of present experience, past socialization and  social 
position (the last is identified as the standpoint). The socialization and social 
position of members of advantaged groups places limitations on their ability to 
re-evaluate biased beliefs, whereas the social standpoints of oppressed groups 
puts their immediate experience at odds with beliefs shaped by their background 
socialization. And this gives the disadvantaged of society a distinct advantage 
when it comes to knowledge; the disadvantaged are most well-placed to notice 
discrepancies between socialization (the salient features of which are shaped by 
the advantaged group) and their immediate experience. “[Hjegemonic groups 
characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about society’s 
functioning, while subordinate groups characteristically have experiences that (at 
least potentially) give rise to more adequate conceptualization.” 22 For example, 
since women are largely denied access to positions of power and wealth, espe-
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daily positions of power over men, they will feel economic and social resistance 
when they bid for such positions. On the other hand, they are taught to believe 
that women, due to their inferior natures, are not deserving of positions of power. 
Their experience of resistance can suggest an explanation of women’s failure to 
attain positions of power different from that prescribed by the socialization 
filtered through popular culture.
Standpoint feminist theorists suggest that we will find an alternative to 
classical epistemology if we focus on women’s experiences and women’s lives. 
The shift in focus, they argue, will emphasize the strengths of qualities that have 
been associated with the feminine and consequently devalued. Standpoint 
theorists argue that studies in the sociology of belief have demonstrated that the 
more empirically and theoretically adequate beliefs (namely those that challenge 
conventional views about women and members of other oppressed populations) 
are in fa c t being produced by persons (namely women, feminists) working within 
nonconventional (namely feminist) research patterns and prescriptions. They try 
to demonstrate the relationship between “better” theory and nonstandard patterns. 
But this is precisely  what traditional investigations of the logical question purport 
to do. Standpoint theorists are not giving alternative epistemologies; they are 
working within the traditional framework and using the traditional standards. 
Standpoint theories are not alternative theories at all; their positive proposals 
differ from classical proposals only in that they prescribe different patterns.
Harding’s expression of standpoint theory is an exemplary version.23 She 
makes clear that what matters from the point of view of the epistemological 
question at issue is not the identity of women or even their experience', for expe­
rience is itself shaped by social relations. Rather what matters from the point of 
view of epistemology is consideration of a pattern o f inference which gives due 
regard to the lives and perspectives of women as an added corrective; these 
patterns are to be preferred over those that fail this condition because they prevent 
certain distortions and correct for obvious bias that would otherwise be intro­
duced.
These sorts of considerations, rather than subverting the view that there are 
patterns of inference to be preferred over others, instead support it. They imply 
that women, when sufficiently sensitized to political issues, will employ patterns 
of inference that will produce truth more reliably than patterns used by others less 
well-placed. And some theorists are sympathetic to the view that nonwomen, 
when “thinking from the experience of women” can do likewise.24 But if this is 
so, then feminist theorists should be sympathetic to traditional epistemology, not 
hostile to it. Traditional foundations, when once laid, will give feminists the re­
sources for a demonstration of the unreliability of patterns on which they now can 
cast but the palest of suspicion.
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2. Rational Censure
An example will serve to illustrate the point that feminists cannot do without tra­
ditional foundations. Consider Martha who believes that most women, especially 
the “liberated” ones, are scheming, manipulative and lacking in the levelheaded­
ness of which men are naturally endowed. Martha is a citizen of a middle-class, 
middle-American town with a politically conservative husband and few close 
friends. Having had a college education, she nevertheless sacrificed any am­
bitions for a career suited to her desires and abilities in favor of supporting her 
husband’s ambitions. With the exception of a few heroines of film and fiction, 
Martha considers most of the women of her acquaintance petty and manipulative 
by nature. She considers this cluster of low traits a cross that she too must bear as 
part of her feminine nature, but maintains that she has worked hard to overcome 
the tendency in herself. Martha believes that, since women are generally manip­
ulative and wanting of an objective disposition, men are generally of more 
estimable moral and rational fiber; men are therefore more to be trusted with the 
serious and weighty business of running industry, academy, and state.
Now every feminist wishes to register a complaint against Martha’s “con­
sciousness.” On what basis can a feminist theory submit a convincing critique of 
Martha’s judgment? On the naturalized treatment of epistemological questions 
the feminist is to direct critique at Martha herself, her situation or the pedigree of 
her judgments. The feminist’s disapprobation of Martha is condemned to be ad  
hominem inasmuch as commendation itself (by the lights of naturalized founda­
tions) is an ad hominem  affair.
The source of the trouble in this case (as it is in innumerable other cases) is 
the fact that Martha’s gender is precisely in alignment with the factors identified 
by naturalistic feminism as materially positive in their (causal) contributory effect 
on rational judgment. Martha’s gender is, as some feminists would have it, a 
positive force as a tributary to her stream of consciousness. Despite this, her 
stream of judgments is more an offering to the mainstream of ills than a counter 
or antidote to them. Now it is indeed possible to give an explanation of Martha’s 
belief without giving an account of which effects (or streams of judgment) are 
positive and which negative. (This is precisely what the independence thesis of 
Section 1, above, argues.)
But in order to advocate or prefer one stream of judgments over another, and 
thus to submit a reproof of Martha, the feminist is positively in need of an account 
of the reliability of inference patterns. Some will respond that it is possible to 
promote points of view rather than inference patterns; and that this satisfies the 
political imperatives in the service of which they speak. Indeed the majority of 
feminist and black theorists advise that we should give priority to the black point
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of view, to the woman’s point of view, in general the point of view of the belea­
guered, because his or her response is more likely to be a correct appraisal of the 
truth, or at least a less distorted construction of the facts, than the response of the 
advantaged person. This reply, however, is not available in Martha’s case.
While feminists have recognized this problem, they have treated it as if it 
were merely the pragmatic problem of finding the right way to understand the 
collective perspective of women.25 But this problem is not merely a pragmatic 
one; it is an essentially theoretical problem. And it is insuperable. Any account of 
the perspective of women must contend with Martha; no account of the collective 
perspective of women can leave any individual woman out of consideration alto­
gether. It might very well be easier for Martha to come to set aside the biases she 
now maintains than it would be for her husband who subscribes to the same prej­
udices, principally because Martha’s beliefs are more likely to come in conflict 
with her experience than her husband’s beliefs are likely to come in conflict with 
his. But Martha’s actual consciousness is not marked by perturbations. How can 
Martha’s point of view—which is essentially the point of view against which a 
women’s perspective is to be contrasted—to figure in the perspective of women? 
We cannot disqualify Martha from figuring in a standpoint of women, because the 
horde of Marthas is practically without number, and because her experience is 
itself largely responsible for the specifics of her belief. Martha’s failing is that she 
has not risen above her socialization, probably for reasons no more recherche 
than laziness. And for this failing no standpoint theory or anything like it can hold 
her accountable. Only an account of epistemic responsibility based on logical 
considerations can level this charge at Martha. Consequently only an evaluation 
of patterns deriving from logical considerations can ground the feminist critique 
of Martha. Thus, far from subverting the ends of feminism, traditional founda­
tions are ultimately in its service.
One might suppose that naturalized foundations fare no worse than the tra­
ditional variety in this regard. After all, no inductive inference pattern is in­
defeasible; even if Martha were implementing some virtuous inference pattern 
she might yet arrive at a false belief, and the traditionalist would have no words 
of censure for her. The point, however, is that, whereas the naturalist feminist can 
have no words of censure for Martha (since, as the theory goes, Martha has 
already done her epistemological part by being female), a feminist advancing 
traditional foundations is at no loss for words of condemnation for Martha’s in­
tellectual complacency. It is therefore a great tactical error for alternativists to set 
themselves against the logical tradition in epistemology.
Those who would abandon traditional foundations in favor of something like 
standpoint theory expunged of all references to logic and truth are subject to a 
further powerful criticism. They are vulnerable to the charge that they occupy
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self-serving positions of critique since, without a neutral logical standard, every 
justification must be attached to a point of view.26 The view that we can 
recommend a standpoint simply on the basis that it belongs to a disadvantaged 
group must explain allegiance to itself as the consequence of adopting (after some 
fashion) the concerns of women or some other disadvantaged group. Suppose a 
question is raised: why not recommend a standpoint on the basis that it belongs 
to an advantaged, rather than a disadvantaged, group? Why not adopt the stand­
point of men, or white persons, or heterosexuals? This option, presumably, is just 
as justifiable, from some standpoint, as the original suggestion is justifiable from 
the standpoint of the disadvantaged.
To this charge it cannot be replied that the asymmetry between advantaged 
and disadvantaged points clearly to a particular option. A simple revelation of an 
asymmetry in standpoints and limitations does not by itself amount to a clear in­
dication of a ground for preferring one branch of the asymmetry against the other. 
An epistemological judgment in favor of a particular branch of an asymmetry 
points to something deeper: that the asymmetry reflects an epistemologically 
relevant ordering; that the asymmetry is, perhaps, a measure sensitive to truth 
production. Therefore discussion of truth production is inelimenable in episte­
mological concerns, even when it is suppressed. In the final analysis, the ordering 
implied by a judgment of preference need not by any means rest on an assump­
tion that humans have a capacity to rise above socioeconomic or gender interests; 
it need rest on nothing more controversial than that some patterns of judgment are 
more truth productive than others. Without reference to such an ordering of 
patterns, we are adrift on an ocean of conflicting interests and preferences without 
a capacity to chart a course since the seascape, though not featureless, is never­
theless void of relevant markings.
3. Objections: Liberalism and Dualities
Consider the following objection:
The argument o f  Section 1 overestimates the ability o f theoreticians to rise above 
their prejudice to undertake the project o f pursuing the logical question there 
described. In order to pursue that project the investigator must be able to attend to the 
question “objectively”— without allowing preferences for one pattern to bias her 
evaluation o f it. But the very possibility o f this is precisely what all forms o f  
feminism reject. Since there are no epistemological standpoints “outside” social 
reality, all claims to knowledge, including those to philosophical knowledge, are 
shaped by their social, material and gender origins. The logical question cannot be 
pursued fruitfully. We must therefore set it aside.
In one breath, this criticism is both ingenious and self-deflating. If it is correct, 
then not only are the arguments in Section 1 tainted, but then so is the objection’s
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own substance. We are left with no basis whatever for conducting philosophical 
inquiry. Now while there is something quite correct about the claim that all belief 
is shaped by its social, material and gender origins, this does not in itself invali­
date any particular belief. It is well known that an argument can be both a 
substitution instance of a valid form of argument and a substitution instance of 
what is conventionally regarded as a “fallacy of reasoning.” By instantiating a 
valid form of argument it is valid; and no further considerations can overturn this 
logical judgment—and particularly not whether the argument is also a substitu­
tion instance of a fallacy. So too in the realm of epistemology. An actual case of 
inference can be at one and the same time a justifiable form of inference (by in­
stantiating a reliable pattern M), and it can be shaped by adverse social and 
political forces. By implementing the relatively reliable pattern M  it is a war­
rantable inference. I have argued the point that no further considerations of a 
belief’s material and social origin can overturn the epistemological judgment.
To put the point another way, my counter to the objection is exactly like my 
counter to the original claim that no judgment of an empirical nature can be 
reliable. Once again I refocus the question as a question about pattern  rather than 
subject. To the question about pattern I argue that the objector’s point misses the 
mark.
The objection of this paragraph can be construed as an objection to what has 
been dubbed “liberalism,” the view that we can learn, through communication 
and argument, to understand another’s viewpoint and achieve a more balanced 
perspective—a more “objective” perspective—of reality. The view I am now 
defending might well be interpreted as a liberal view in this sense. I will embrace 
the “liberal” label if the critic will accept that a liberal view is consistent with 
feminist political critique as well as with the claim that women and members of 
other oppressed groups may have easier access (in virtue of their social status and 
concomitant experience) to more reliable patterns of inference on certain subject 
matters. Of the latter two claims I am certain. By accepting the unfortunate “lib­
eralism” label I become target to a further objection:
The argument o f Section 1 recapitulates the form o f fallacy committed by Dcscartes 
when he insisted on a sharp distinction and consequently on an ontological separation 
between mind and body. This preoccupation with separations, a typically masculinist 
and supremacist approach to problems, is in evidence here in the argument’s distinc­
tion between logical and sociological questions. And it constitutes the basic 
problematic o f  Western philosophy, posing an insuperable philosophical barrier to the 
possibility o f  knowledge. The perspective and method o f the author o f  Section 1 is so 
shaped by the standpoint o f the hegemonic that it produces only distortions; its 
products are highly infected and cannot be considered reliable. Som eone hostile to 
the patriarchal attitude— as alternativists ought to be— will not be persuaded by the
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argument. The m ethodology o f separations excludes from the outset feeling, emotion 
and intuition from the sphere of the rational.27
Those who accept this criticism share a particular estimate of the source of the 
standard metaphysical categories of philosophy, which issue in what some 
consider insuperable “dualities,” in the patriarchal preoccupation with separation 
and control. Presumably a less preoccupied perspective will not display this array 
of categories, but will instead present a more holistic or “organic” conception of 
the world and the categories of Western philosophy. And feminists, while they 
may agree with the diagnosis given in the objection, disagree about the correc­
tives to Western categories. Some authors have suggested that the dialectical 
pattern of historical materialism is itself a clear alternative to traditional 
paradigms.28 In contrast, I suggest that historical materialism, as a proposal con­
forming to Schema G, is consistent with traditional epistemology because, as I 
have argued, any proposal that explains the propagation of intersubjective belief 
via causal processes is consistent with any answer whatever to the logical 
question.29
But the objection we are currently considering to traditional foundations can 
easily be met. I will, for the sake of argument, grant the point that the perspective 
defended in Section 1 is shaped by attitudes that favor the interests of those who 
already have dominion over the economic and political resources of socicty. As I 
have already argued, however, this is not enough to indict the pattern  of argument 
purporting to establish that answers to the generation question have no bearing on 
the logical question. Whatever may be the case concerning my motivational 
structure, I may in addition be employing (whether consciously or not) patterns 
of inference that are nonetheless reliable. The question of reliability cannot be 
settled by investigation of the rectitude or pathology of my psychological dispo­
sitions. They can be settled only by logical investigations of the relationship of 
the content of my premises and conclusions to the facts of the actual world. No 
part of the objection is directed against this part of the argument. The attack is 
directed squarely at my psychology—which I need not even trouble to defend.
Mariam Thalos
State University o f  New York 
a t Buffalo
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1. See Goldman (1985); Kornblith (1985b).
2. Quine (1969), 75.
3. Nelson (1990) concurs that feminist epistem ology is best understood in relation to 
critiques associated with Quine.
4. Quine (1953), 41.
5. Causal theories like Dretske (1981) are engaged no less in discussion of the pro­
duction of true beliefs than are Bayesian theories.
6. This point has been made by a number of writers, among them Quine (1974), 
Friedman (1979) and Goldman (1979).
7. Nisbett and Ross (1988) lists a number o f what they call “heuristics.” These heuris­
tics, or inference strategies, are described in logical, rather than psychological, terms. In 
som e passages Nisbett and Ross suggest that these heuristics offer an explanation of 
certain human judgments. In other passages, however, they suggest that human under­
standing o f the rapid flow o f  social events “may depend less on these inference patterns” 
(p. 200) than on a large store o f general background “theory” (presumably acquired early 
on in development). Both these suggestions are compatible with the view  I advance here 
if  we think o f heuristics as inference patterns, implementable by psychological processes, 
and background “theory” as instilled by som e psychophysiological process. The heuristic 
is a logical entity, implementable by a process; the “theory” is put into place by the psy­
chophysiological process.
8. Schema G is thus compatible with Harding’s (1990) sympathy with the “strong 
programme.” The social causes o f  truthful beliefs are as much subject to investigation as 
those that issue in error-ridden corpora o f beliefs.
9. Quine (1970) and his followers suggest there is a further gap: a gap between one’s 
theory and the totality o f possible observations. This gap goes by the name underdetermi­
nation. See W ilson (1980) for a contrary opinion.
10. There are, for example, concerns about whether we must know something about the 
error mechanisms at play in data-gathering. The independence for which I argue leaves 
issues o f  error, which I bracket here, com pletely untouched.
11. Notice that this makes historical materialism, as a candidate proposal conforming to 
Schema G, compatible with traditional epistemological foundations.
12. And indeed those who issue this challenge frame the logical question completely 
differently from the way I have described here; see especially Kornblith (1985b) and 
Goldman (1985).
13. Friedman (1979).
14. Pace Kornblith (1985a), p. 12.
15. Forster and Sober (1994) show this may not be necessary to the degree Friedman 
requires.
16. Friedman him self goes on to argue that, for all we know, the theories produced by 
the inductive methods we endorse might actually undermine those methods. There is no 
guarantee that the theories o f the world we will produce, if  true, w ill support the reliabili­
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19. Komblith’s insistence on drawing attention to causal mechanisms controlling a 
subject’s belief adoption affords us an occasion to offer a slightly modified (if somewhat 
more controversial) argument in favor o f the traditional framework. To rate an inference 
pattern is to return an evaluation of its reliability. N ow  reliability, like validity, is a 
semantic relation: it involves the relation between the content o f  a linguistic medium and 
the world. Evaluation o f a mechanism or process, on the other hand, is a different matter. 
A  complete description o f a causal process connecting two items o f belief can be rendered 
on purely syntactic grounds (this is the controversial component o f this argument). Since 
syntax and semantics are independent dimensions o f an inference, the compatibility o f  
proposals on the logical question with anything conforming to Schem a G is explained. If 
evaluation o f process is to be ultimately tied to matters o f truth production, it must ulti­
mately be given semantic dimensions. That dimension is precisely what the logical 
framework supplies.
20. Sec Jaggar (1983) among many.
21. Cf. Friedman (1979), p. 156.
22. M ills (1988), p. 246.
23. Harding (1991), see esp. p. 123; cf. Harding (1993).
24. Harding (1993).
25. See especially Jaggar (1983), pp. 385 ff.
26. Imagine the retort that traditional epistem ology is guilty o f this same sin. The 
argument I have been making— that the traditional framework fosters the position that 
there are patterns o f inference (perhaps typically more accessible to women and other dis­
advantaged populations) that arc better than others with regard to truth production— is 
evidence otherwise.
27. This objection is inspired by considerations raised in Flax (1983), Harding (1982), 
Hartsock (1983), Jaggar (1983, 1989) and McMillan (1982).
28. Jaggar (1983), 358.
29. Hekman (1990), 40, gives independent reasons for the same conclusion.
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